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Sustaining Coalition through Adaptive Electoral Alliance:
Kōmeitō’s local adjustment mechanism in electoral cooperation with 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
Sukeui Sohn
This paper attempts to unravel how Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Kōmeitō were 
able to sustain their coalition partnership over the past two decades despite policy and ideological 
incompatibilities. This paper argues that it is the mechanism of flexible adaptation installed at local 
levels that has enabled the Kōmeitō to avoid over-supporting the LDP counterpart and deter risks 
of cooperating with the senior partner in times of political crises. From the system of candidate 
recommendations to allocation of votes, the two parties operate under such a system that allows 
individuated incorporation of Kōmeitō votes on the one hand, and to delicately adjust the outflow of 
electoral resources through candidate-based support mechanism, on the other.  
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The Puzzle of lDP-KōmeiTō AlliAnce 
Panned as the “number-crunching” “life-prolonging treatment” of the Liberal Democratic 
Party (lDP), the initiation of the party alliance between the lDP and the Kōmeitō in 1999 
was, to say the least, contested. The antagonistic relationship between the two parties reached 
its peak in the mid-1990s—only a few years before they became what proved to be the most 
successful inter-party partnership Japan has ever seen. in 1994, the Kōmeitō Diet members 
joined the formation of new frontier Party (nfP, shinshintou), an initiative driven by a 
former lDP representative ozawa ichiro, who, along with other reform-minded conservative 
politicians, upheld the banner of ‘alternative axis’ to the lDP. Threatened by the advancement 
of nfP in the 1995 upper house election, in which the newly established party earned forty 
seats against lDP’s forty-six, the lDP’s attacks on the nfP, as well as on the Kōmeitō’s 
support base, Sōka Gakkai, accelerated. calling the nfP the “Gakkai party,” the lDP’s 
castigation against the Kōmeitō developed alongside with the attacks on Sōka Gakkai, whom 
they characterized as ‘undemocratic and authoritarian’ religious organization that violates the 
principle of the separation of politics and religion.1 The (former) Kōmeitō, as well as Sōka 
Gakkai, retaliated against these claims by claiming that the constitution does not forbid the 
involvement of religious organization with political activities, and that the Sōka Gakkai does 
not affect policy proposition or personnel matters of the nfP in any way.2 
1 lDP’s attacks on the Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai appeared most frequently on the party’s weekly 
newspaper Jiyū Shinpō, which ran a weekly column entitled NFP-Sōka Gakkai Watching between 
January 1996 and october 1997. Also, Shirakawa Katsuhiko, lDP representative, published a 
book criticizing the party’s decision to form a coalition alliance with the Kōmeitō, in which he 
listed the name of lDP members who also criticized the lDP-Kōmeitō-liberal Party initiative as 
‘unconstitutional’ (Shirakawa 2000).
2 Kōmei Shimbun, 5 August 1995 
JouRnAl of inTeRnATionAl AnD AReA STuDieS 
Volume 26, number 2, 2019, pp.77-97
78 SuKeui Sohn
it was only natural, considering the extent of negative campaigns against one another 
throughout the mid-1990s, that the two parties’ abrupt transformation from ‘sworn enemies’ 
to ‘coalition partners’ following the 1998 upper house election ignited criticism against ‘illicit 
collusion’ which failed to present shared policy goals. A few studies have demonstrated that 
the Kōmeitō’s policy preferences were closer to the DPJ, rather than the lDP (Kabashima 
and Yamamoto 2004, Kato and laver 2003).3 in fact, when the nfP disintegrated after 
a series of intra-party struggles and the old Kōmeitō members reorganized as the new 
Kōmeitō, it was the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), not the lDP, with whom they sought 
for the possibility of political and electoral alliance, redefining itself as a ‘member of 
opposition alliance.’4 Furthermore, the degree of ideological and policy incompatibilities 
between the lDP and the Kōmeitō remained significant even as coalition partners. Kōmeitō 
Diet members were characterized as ‘centrist-liberal’ in foreign, security, and social policy 
axis, while ‘traditional-centrist’ in economic policies. The lDP members, on the other hand, 
are ‘conservative’ in the former category and ‘traditional’ in the latter. in other words, the 
members of the two parties may agree on economic policies, while they stand opposite to one 
another in foreign, security, and social policy arenas. What is striking is the policy position of 
the members of the DPJ; in all policy arenas, their policy positions (centrist-liberal in foreign, 
security, and social policies and centrist-reformist in economic policies) are significantly 
closer to that of Kōmeitō’s (Taniguchi et al. 2010). The lDP-Kōmeitō alliance, in other 
words, was not facilitated by the compatibility of policy preferences, as classic literatures on 
coalition formation suggest (Axelrod 1970, leiserson 1966, liff and maeda 2018).
Such mismatches of policy preferences between the lDP and the Kōmeitō have invited 
speculations regarding the true objective behind this peculiar two-party alliance—electoral 
cooperation. The most conventional view on why the lDP-Kōmeitō alliance sustained 
despite policy incompatibility focuses on the ‘electoral’ aspect of cooperation, rather than 
the number-games in the Diet (Yakushiji 2016, Shimada 2007, nakano 2016). The existing 
analyses of the two-party relations have focused on the ‘efficacy’ of electoral cooperation that 
takes place during national—particularly the lower house— elections, based on which the 
lDP’s acquiring of the largest share of lower house seats has been made possible after 2000. 
Some studies suggest that, without the electoral cooperation with the Kōmeitō and Sōka 
Gakkai, the lDP would have single-handedly lost general elections to the largest opposition 
party as early as 2003 (Kawato 2004, 270-274: 270-274, Kabashima 2014: 371-387, liff and 
maeda 2018).
While these studies succeed in highlighting the critical importance of the Kōmeitō votes 
in the maintaining of lDP-Kōmeitō coalition alliance and thus the coalition government, 
such static perspective on the two-party relations leaves room for critical questions. for one 
thing, these literatures simply assume Kōmeitō/Sōka Gakkai as monolithic social entity, 
who has apparently come to rely on ‘policy appeals’ to mobilize votes rather than its social 
identity (ehrhardt 2009). Another critical gap in these understanding of lDP-Kōmeitō 
alliance can be found in empirical facts: They overlook the divergent levels of ‘cooperation’ 
3 Kato and laver’s analysis argued that the lDP’s approach to the Kōmeitō in the late 1990s can be 
explained by the two parties’ similar policy positions on economic policies, yet they also implied that 
the stability of the coalition government would be impaired if and when the policy emphasis shifts 
to other policy axis, for which the two parties do not share the same preferences—such as external 
policy and the issues of national identity.
4 Asahi Shimbun, 6 march 1999.
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that takes place during national elections. in other words, it fails to explain why the electoral 
cooperation between the lDP and Kōmeitō is characterized by unequal distribution of 
electoral resources, rather than by a commensurate vote allocation process. Such limitation 
stems from the common understanding toward the high level of coherence among Sōka 
Gakkai members, who are generally discussed synonymously with Kōmeitō supporters and 
characterized by highly-centralized hierarchical organizational structure (nishijima 1968, 
murakami 1969, hori 1999). 
This paper is an attempt to unravel how the two parties with dissimilar policy preferences 
have managed to overcome them in the construction of one of the most successful electoral 
alliances. i will argue that it was through the development of an ‘adaptive cooperation 
mechanism’ established between the lDP and the Kōmeitō at the local level—prefectural 
and district—that has enabled these two ‘strange bedfellows’ to implement effective electoral 
cooperation after the 2000s. unlike the lDP who evaluates Kōmeitō candidates collectively 
at the central level, Kōmeitō adopted ‘candidate-based’ evaluation system vis-à-vis the lDP 
candidates, which operates virtually at the prefectural level. The significant role of Kōmeitō’s 
prefectural-level decision-making in terms of vote allocation becomes evident not only in 
issuing of recommendations, but particularly in adjusting the timing of the commencement of 
electoral cooperation. furthermore, as it can be inferred from the Kōmeitō’s emphasis on the 
‘quality of candidate (kōhosha no shitsu)’ in engaging in electoral cooperation, the degree of 
vote mobilization is bargained between individual lDP candidates and Kōmeitō’s respective 
local organization, rather than between parties’ central leaderships. 
Such locally-ordained cooperation mechanisms function as risk-aversion apparatus 
for the Kōmeitō, for not only do they allow the party’s central leadership to accommodate 
diverse local demands of its supporters, but they also mitigate the risk of over-supporting the 
lDP counterpart by decentralizing the decision-making process and adjusting the outflow of 
its electoral resources. essentially, this marginal autonomy granted to Kōmeitō’s decision-
making bodies at prefectural and district levels becomes the key organ for adaptive—
therefore flexible—executions of electoral cooperation between the two parties, through 
which the two coalition partners with distinct social and political foundations have managed 
successful alliance partnership over the past two decades.
loGic of elecToRAl cooPeRATion 
conventional view on the efficacy of lDP-Kōmeitō electoral alliance draws upon the 
new electoral environments established after the 1994 reform (Shimada 2007: 162-164, 
nakano 2016: 2-8). Generally, the reason for the initiation as well as the duration of this 
unlikely partnership is explained by the electoral regime—specifically, the new electoral 
system adopted in 1994. Japan adopted a new electoral rule in 1994 for the lower house 
election, which combined single-member district system (SmD, 300 seats, currently 289) and 
proportional representation (PR, currently 176), replacing the SnTV system. The electoral 
reform brought two major changes to the nature of electoral competition in Japan. First, since 
the new electoral system that centers on SmD system was expected to reduce the effective 
number of parties and induce two-party system and party-based competitions (Duverger 
1964, cox 1997, cain 1987, carey and Shugart 1995). The lDP’s challenge came from 
reactionary realignment of the opposition forces among the conservatives. Specifically, the 
rise of the new frontier Party (nfP) and then Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) as a viable 
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opposition party since the mid-1990s seemed to indicate the rise of ‘two-party competition’ 
under the new electoral system. from Kōmeitō’s perspective, on the other hand, the major 
challenge that derived from the new electoral rule was the high election threshold for winning 
in districts. As a minor party, Kōmeitō proved unable to mobilize enough votes to elect its 
own candidate, even in those districts where Kōmeitō’s support base is most concentrated—
in the urban regions.5 
The second critical alteration in the electoral competition under the new rule was the 
urbanization of the electoral competition. District reapportionment as a part of electoral 
reform significantly reduced the vote-seat disparity, redressing the rural-biased district 
malapportionment and increased the value of urban votes (mcelwain 2012). under the 
1955 system, the lDP was essentially a ‘rural party’ established upon clientalist relationship 
between individual politicians, who poured subsidies and public projects to economically 
dependent rural areas and interest groups who, in return, gathered under the politicians’ 
organizational machine (Scheiner 2006, Rosenbluth and Thies 2010). This rural-biased 
political system worked in favor for the lDP throughout the period of economic growth, yet 
the decline of agricultural industry, population outflow from the rural areas and shrinking 
kōenkai activities demolished the fortification upon which the lDP’s predominance had 
stood (Sugawara 2004). Simply put, the lDP came to face the necessity of expanding its 
organizational focus in urban districts, as the electoral reform as well as the demographic 
changes enhanced the necessity of attracting urban voters. 
under this newly consolidating electoral environment, the lDP and Kōmeitō found 
it effective to engage in ‘vote-bartering.’ The mechanism of electoral cooperation is 
summarized into a simple phrase: ‘lDP for district, Kōmei for PR’ (senkyokuha jimin, 
hireiha koumei). The supporters of the two parties are encouraged to split their votes between 
SmD and PR tiers. Since the Kōmeitō is a small party and fields only a limited number of 
candidates in SmDs, the Kōmeitō supporters vote for the lDP candidate in their district, 
while the lDP candidates return the favor by asking their supporters to vote for the Kōmeitō 
in PR. Based on the Kōmeitō’s vote counts in PR, and taking the Kōmeitō supporters’ high 
level of coherence into account, some estimate that about 20,000 to 30,000 Kōmeitō votes are 
delivered to the lDP’s candidate in each district.6 To illustrate how critical Kōmeitō support 
could be for a candidate running in SmDs, let us take an example from the 2003 lh election. 
The average number of votes casted in each of 300 SmDs was about 204,000,7which means 
that, if a candidate could earn about 100,000 votes, his/her election was almost certainly 
guaranteed. if we assume that the Kōmeitō could mobilize 20,000 votes in each district, 
this pool of organized votes make up for 20 per cent of the required number of votes for 
a candidate to become elected. Such leverage the Kōmeitō possesses would even enhance 
further in the districts where competitions are close, as well as in urban districts where votes 
are relatively harder to organize given the floating tendency of the urban voters (Tanaka and 
martin, 2003).8
5 for example, Kōmeitō’s Yamaguchi natsuro lost against lDP’s hirasawa Katsuen in District Tokyo 
17 in the 2000 lower house election.
6 This calculation is based on Kōmeitō’s vote gains in PR during national elections, which usually 
range between seven to nine million votes. Divided by the number of single-member districts (300), 
some believe that the Kōmeitō is able to mobilize 20,000 to 30,000 votes per district. 
7 The total number of casted votes was 61,196,418 nationwide (turnout rate 59.6%)
8 Tanaka and martin defined the concept of ‘new independent voters’ as the group of ‘anti-partisan 
SuSTAininG coAliTion ThRouGh ADAPTiVe elecToRAl AlliAnce 81
While this approach to the mechanism of electoral cooperation between the LDP and 
the Kōmeitō explains the logic behind the cooperative relationship between the two parties, 
however, it fails to address the dynamics of the two-party electoral cooperation. in other 
words, it overlooks the fact that the electoral cooperation does not take place uniformly 
across districts. one indicator that illuminates the divergent degrees of electoral cooperation 
is the number of recommendations given to the lDP candidates from the Kōmeitō. 
Recommendation, or suisen, is an official declaration of support from the party’s central 
leadership to the candidate of other parties, and especially in the single-member competitions, 
the recommendation itself is what comes closest to endorsement from parties other than its 
own. in other words, recommendation, like party labels, can become an important source of 
information among voters in making their voting decisions. As Table 1 indicates, the number 
of recommendations given from the Kōmeitō to the lDP candidates varies across general 
elections, indicating the divergent degrees of cooperation between the lDP and Kōmeitō in 
district/individual levels. 
The existing studies that focus solely on the electoral regime in explaining the lDP-
Kōmeitō cooperative mechanism overlook such differing degrees of ‘cooperation’ between 
the two parties across districts and elections. Such disregard seems to have derived not only 
from ‘biased’ perceptions toward the Kōmeitō/Sōka Gakkai as a coherent socio-political 
group, but also from the exclusive association of ‘electoral alliance’ with the electoral regime. 
it was Duverger who first argued that it was the electoral regime that determines the 
nature of electoral alliances across political parties. While his mentioning of electoral alliance 
does not go much farther than claiming its ‘local’ and ‘implicit’ nature, he implies that the 
study of electoral alliance may be more difficult than those of parliamentary or governmental 
alliance; he claims that expressing support for another candidate as the candidate ‘stands 
down’ is, to borrow his words, ‘more effective but more embarrassing’ (Duverger 1964: 
331). Put simply, the discreet nature of electoral alliance derives not only from the secretive 
nature of political parties’ electoral strategies, but also from the possibility that such outright 
electoral arrangement formed across parties may question the ‘ethics’ of particular political 
alliance (White 2018). 
While most studies on electoral alliance focus almost exclusively on the electoral regime 
independents and ex-partisan independents,’ who were overrepresented in the urban areas and had 
made up more than 50% of voting population in Japan by the mid-1990s.
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Recommendation 
from the LDP 14 10 9 8 9 10
Source: Asahi Shimbun
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in explaining party behaviors (Bawn 1999, herrmann and Pappi 2008, Gschwend 2006, 
Roberts 1988), electoral regime is not the only institution that constrains the behaviors 
of individual political actors. Because inter-party cooperation is carried out within the 
framework of organizational interaction, individual actors are constrained by their own 
party’s internal organizational structure as well as the set of rules it provides. in other 
words, the divergence of electoral alliances cannot be explained without shedding light on 
local-specific context and already-established set of institutions around which the actors 
operate their electoral strategies. Simply put, the interactions among parties and its members 
takes place not only at the central level but also at all different ‘faces’ of multi-level party 
organizations. While a cynic may argue that the lDP as well as Kōmeitō/Sōka Gakkai only 
cares about the party’s survival, the Sōka Gakkai members’ unwavering devotion to their 
beliefs and political identity as ‘pacifist party for the mass’ cannot go simply overlooked. 
Similarly, it is one thing to assume candidate’s or political parties’ incentives for vote 
maximization at the cost of overlooking policy or ideological incompatibilities, yet it is 
another to overlook how the supporters are incorporated into the system of electoral alliance 
that deem ‘unnatural’ and even ‘compromising’ to their policy preferences and beliefs.
There are largely two explanations given to how the lDP and the Kōmeitō have managed 
to overlook their policy/ideological distance in maintaining the coalition partnership. first, 
some claim that the lDP and Kōmeitō have never been too far apart, at least in terms of 
ideological inclinations of their supporters. While the Kōmeitō put forth its political identity 
as progressive or ‘non-lDP’ front throughout the cold War period, the voting behaviors of 
the Kōmeitō supporters suggest mixed attitudes vis-à-vis conservative values. A study on 
the two general elections held in 1963 and 1967 analyzes the vote gains of eleven Kōmeitō 
candidates who ran as the party’s first campaign for lower house seats in 1967 (Tanaka 2005: 
83-84). The analysis shows that the Kōmeitō candidates’ vote gains in the 1967 election are 
almost equal to the number of vote losses of the lDP and JSP candidates in those districts, 
based on which the author concludes that, before the 1967 general election, Kōmeitō votes 
were equally divided between lDP and JSP.9 Such ‘double-identity’ of Kōmeitō supporters 
seems to have rooted in the history of their migration from conservative rural regions to 
progressive urban cities during the period of high economic growth, which created a social 
group that is conservative by nature but grew progressive as they became incorporated into 
lower strata of social hierarchy (Shimada 2007: 133-135). in fact, one Sōka Gakkai member 
who was in his sixties identified himself as ‘always been conservative.’10 Furthermore, 
Kōmeitō’s double-sided attitude toward the lDP in the pre-coalition period is most exposed 
in local elections and governance. not only did Kōmeitō cooperate with the lDP in local 
elections such as Kyoto gubernatorial election held in 1970 by supporting a joint candidate 
who ran against JcP-endorsed ninagawa Torazō, in metropolitan cities such as Tokyo, 
Kōmeitō formed a ruling coalition with the lDP in the metropolitan assembly since the 
early stage (Sasaki 2011: 69-70). Based on these political developments, some contend that 
the Kōmeitō supporters shared similar political/ideological backgrounds with the lDP’s 
traditional power base and had displayed a possibility for political cooperation long before 
the formation of coalition government.11
9 he also adds that the Kōmeitō candidates in urban districts brought in new Kōmeitō voters who did 
not vote before 1967, which amounts to 5.3% of total vote gains by the Kōmeitō candidates. 
10 interview with a professor of Soka university, 17 January 2017
11 others point to the Kōmeitō-Tanaka Kakuei relations in explaining Kōmeitō’s often-cooperative 
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Second perspective regarding the sustainability of the lDP-Kōmeitō alliance contends 
that the Kōmeitō has been successful in drawing out policy compromises from the lDP, 
particularly in such policy fields as social welfare, which have served as lubricant for 
cooperative operation of coalition government. As the lDP’s neoliberalist drive accelerated 
after the 2000s, Kōmeitō took pride as the last stronghold of centrist values (or what they 
call ningen shugi), successfully implementing policy negotiations in such legislatures as 
child allowance, national pension system reform, introduction of reduced tax rate, and 
reconstruction assistance after the Great east Japan earthquake (hasunuma and Klein 2014, 
Kōmeitōshi hensan iinkai 2014: 247-258, 299-307). furthermore, Kōmeitō has emphasized 
its role as a ‘brake’ on lDP’s rightist agenda, particularly in the field of security policies 
(Sato and Yamaguchi 2016: 60-70). Analyzing the series of policy negotiations regarding the 
collective self-defense in 2014, liff and maeda (2018) demonstrate how the Kōmeitō was 
able to induce policy compromises from the LDP, despite asymmetric power balance within 
the Diet. 
Yet assigning the sustainability of two-party government to the success of leadership-
level policy negotiations as well as the ‘conservative nature’ of Kōmeitō supporters is an 
oversimplification of this complex coalition alliance, and essentially stands upon the false 
presumption that both lDP and Kōmeitō/Sōka Gakkai as coherent political groups.12 it is 
another matter whether Kōmeitō supporters are in full support of policy positions proposed 
by the coalition government, and if so, why Kōmeitō adopts ‘candidate-based evaluation 
system’ instead of agreeing upon the holistic electoral support vis-à-vis lDP. in other words, 
it does not explain why the Kōmeitō implemented an adaptive cooperation mechanism in 
cooperating with the lDP, rather than top-down electoral mobilization, which functioned as a 
defensive apparatus to accommodate diverse demands without damaging its high coherence 
among party supporters. Such flexibility became essential not only because it was necessary 
to accommodate policy demands from the lDP, but more so because of the diversity of 
electoral demands that vary across districts and elections.  
The rest of this paper argues that the two unlikely partners have managed to overcome 
policy/ideological incompatibilities at district levels primarily by institutionalizing candidate-
centered cooperative mechanism at local levels, which minimizes the risk of inevitable 
political compromises embedded in the two parties’ dissimilar ideological and policy 
preferences. As following sections discuss, such marginal autonomy given to the Kōmeitō’s 
local support organizations as well as individual voters helps assuage the possible frictions 
that could arise within the Kōmeitō/Sōka Gakkai organizations during the course of electoral 
cooperation with lDP counterpart, who may or may not share Kōmeitō or its supporters’ 
political interests. in other words, by developing internal mechanism centering on the 
principle of ‘individual-based’ evaluation system vis-à-vis the lDP candidates, Kōmeitō 
engages in carefully scaled mobilization of its electoral resources, rather than holistic and 
collective electoral support for its senior partner.
stance toward the lDP in the pre-alliance period (nakano 2016: 35-36; Yakushiji 2016: 65-37).
12 The discord between party leadership and Sōka Gakkai believers regarding security legislation and 
okinawa base issues have drawn some attention in recent years. in 2016, three former Sōka Gakkai 
members published a book criticizing Kōmeitō’s handling of security legislation, a symbolic event 
that exposed growing tension between party leadership and some supporters (noguchi, Takigawa, 
and Kodaira 2016).
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inSTiTuTionS of elecToRAl AlliAnce 
While it is undoubtedly true that the Sōka Gakkai members and Kōmeitō voters largely 
overlap, and that they are quite avid supporters of Kōmeitō, when it comes to cooperation 
with the lDP, the same level of enthusiasm is rarely observed. in fact, the institutionalization 
of the electoral alliance between the two parties has been characterized by risk-aversion. The 
Kōmeitō as well as the lDP have established such system so that they may maximize their 
benefits with the smallest cost possible; the electoral cooperation between the two parties, in 
other words, is characterized by unequal distribution of electoral resources. And the critical 
function of Kōmeitō’s unequal resource distribution is systematized at the lower polity 
strata—namely at prefectural and district levels. 
This section first discusses the Kōmeitō’s ‘candidate-based’ evaluation system that 
operates as the key component of the party’s instrument of risk-aversion, whose origin 
goes back to the period of organizational reconfiguration during the nfP initiative. Second, 
it sheds light on the recommendation system, a derivative of candidate-based evaluation 
system installed at the prefectural level, and how it operates as a buffer against over-
supporting the LDP candidates in single-member districts. While the bargaining for resource 
allocation commences at the prefectural level through candidate-based evaluation system, 
the prefectural level negotiation determines not only whether to support the lDP candidates, 
but also how much support should be given—by ‘timing’ the execution of cooperation and 
scaling the degree of electoral support at the district level. finally, it discusses the mechanism 
of ‘candidate-based’ electoral mobilization at district levels that allows Kōmeitō to deter 
risks in accommodating often-conflicting internal and external demands in the executions of 
electoral cooperation.
inTRoDucTion of cAnDiDATe-BASeD eVAluATion SYSTem 
in cooperating with candidates from other parties, religious groups in Japan have 
traditionally engaged in candidate-based sponsorship, rather than expressing support for a 
single party (Klein and Reed 2014). When it comes to supporting candidates other than its 
own, Kōmeitō is no exception—even under the coalition framework. Kōmeitō has maintained 
its principle of ‘candidate-based’ cooperation with the lDP through the establishment 
of candidate evaluation system. notwithstanding the inter-party agreement on electoral 
cooperation, Kōmeitō indeed carries out evaluation process vis-à-vis each lDP candidate 
before and during election period. 
The origin of the candidate-based evaluation system dates back to the period of new 
frontier Party (nfP) initiative (1994-1997), during which the Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai 
underwent internal crisis over the issue of the dissolution of the old Kōmeitō. While Kōmeitō 
leadership, particularly ozawa ichirō’s political confidant ichikawa Yūichi, was convinced 
that the complete merger of Kōmeitō organization to the nfP was possible before the 1995 
upper house election in July, the reluctance of Sōka Gakkai and local Kōmeitō organizations 
eventually impeded the ichikawa’s plan for swift merger from coming about (Yakushiji 
2016: 136-141). instead, the party and Sōka Gakkai agreed to take up ‘two-step merger’ plan, 
which essentially divided Kōmeitō organization between national Diet members and local 
organizations/assembly members, while the latter was to retain its organizational autonomy 
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from the nfP.13 Such severing of Kōmeitō’s national and local organizations reflected Sōka 
Gakkai’s concern over the allocation of electoral resources. Prior to the official establishment 
of the nfP, Sōka Gakkai declared that it would keep certain distance from the new party (to 
be named later) after the dissolution of the Kōmeitō. on november 10, 1994, five days after 
the Kōmeitō adopted the dissolution motion at the national Party convention, Sōka Gakkai 
announced Basic View on Prospective Relationship with Politics (kongono seijini kansuru 
kihonteki kenkai), in which the organization claimed that, while their one-party support for 
the local-level Kōmeitō (after the dissolution of the party) would remain unchanged, same 
merit would not apply to the new party:
•  As the 55 system has come to an end, today’s political situation in Japan is undergoing 
significant changes, calling for reforms in various dimensions. Kōmeitō’s participation in the 
new-new Party can be credited as a constructive decision in response to this time of great 
change. Standing on such historic turning point, we, Sōka Gakkai, wish to clarify our basic 
principles in dealing with politics hereafter. 
•  from now onward, the criteria for candidate support will be evaluated on individual basis, 
after giving consideration to each candidate’s political attitude, policy preferences, personal 
qualities and views, accomplishment, and his/her understanding of Gakkai ideology.
•  Gakkai will carry out evaluation process before each election. The specific decision will be 
made based on careful evaluations by central committee (chūōkaigi) or each Society council 
(shakai kyōgikai) within central, regional, or prefectural headquarters set up by the central 
committee.14
Simply put, Sōka Gakkai recanted their original position of ‘one-party support’ (ittō shiji), 
and declared to take on individual-based evaluation/recommendation system once the new 
party was launched. By introducing an evaluation system centering on shakai kyōgikai, 
or Society council, on every polity level (central, regional, and prefectural), Sōka Gakkai 
essentially put forth that their support for each candidate will be decided based on the 
candidate’s ‘quality,’ rather than his/her party affiliation. 
upon this shift in Sōka Gakkai’s policy on electoral cooperation, Kōmeitō also followed 
suit. At the 77th central Party committee held on october 1, 1994, where the Kōmeitō 
announced the party agenda for the upcoming 1995 general local election, then the Kōmeitō’s 
chairman of election committee ōta Akihiro explained the new principles in electoral 
cooperation at local level:   
•  At this point, the Kōmeitō will not be obligated to engage in electoral cooperation just 
because the candidates are running as endorsed candidates from new party [i.e. nfP, in the 
next local election]. until now, we have engaged in electoral cooperation with other parties 
based on three basic principles: (1) it should be carried out based on agreements made at local 
levels, not at the central level; (2) it should exhibit some level of give-and-take balance; (3) 
All agreements on electoral cooperation must be endorsed by the party’s central executive 
committee. 
he further added two criteria enforced by the Kōmeitō election committee: (4) The candidate 
13 Kōmei Shinbum, 9 August 1994
14 Kōmei Shinbum, 11 november 1994
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has profound understanding of the Kōmeitō’s policies; and (5) the person is deemed worthy 
of the party’s support in terms of his/her personality and insights.15 Such emphasis on 
‘personal quality’ of candidates was meant to function as a deterrence apparatus against non-
Kōmeitō nfP candidates in future elections, and to declare party’s unchanging preference for 
Kōmeitō representatives over other nfP candidates, who would be ‘competing’ in the same 
district under the multi-member district system in the local election. 
Along with the principle of ‘candidate-based evaluation,’ another critical principle of 
electoral cooperation for Kōmeitō/Sōka Gakkai organizations reinforced in 1994 was the 
criticality of local arrangement. ōta’s emphasis on ‘agreement made at local levels’ and 
consideration on ‘give-and-take balance’ implies that the details of electoral cooperation are 
left up to local arrangement, rather than to the inter-party negotiation at the central level. 
Such locally-administered mechanism of cooperation can be interpreted as the embodiment 
of the social group’s defensiveness. Kōmeitō’s high election rate under the multi-member 
district system, which usually marks nearly one hundred per cent in local elections, depends 
highly on the accuracy of vote allocations among the party’s candidates, where the votes are 
evenly distributed to maximize the number of elected candidates under the multi-member 
district system.16 Locally-accumulated information on the demography of its supporters 
enables precise allocation of candidates and votes—a well-acknowledged feature of Kōmeitō/
Sōka Gakkai organization. 
Such framework for electoral cooperation characterized by candidate-based evaluation 
system and locally-arranged allocation of electoral resources became the key components for 
lDP-Kōmeitō electoral cooperation after 1999, facilitating the adaptability to the divergence 
of local contexts of the two-party relations. essentially, the Kōmeitō substantiated these 
aspects of electoral cooperation by institutionalization of ‘individual recommendation 
system,’ whose operation is delegated to the party’s prefectural headquarters.
PRefecTuRAl-leVel neGoTiATionS: RecommenDATion SYSTem
upon the inauguration of the lDP-Kōmeitō alliance, the system of candidate-based 
evaluation was carried over to negotiate the allocation of electoral resources in the form of 
individual-based ‘recommendation system.’ Depending on whether the lDP candidate has 
received recommendation from the Kōmeitō, the degree to which Kōmeitō supporters in 
the district spend their resources in electoral campaign could largely differ. once the lDP 
candidate in the district receives recommendation from the Kōmeitō, then the local Kōmeitō 
activists make explicit request to the Kōmeitō supporters to vote for the lDP candidate. 
often, such pledges are made repetitively to individual supporters in order to consolidate 
the support for the endorsed LDP candidates.17 in other words, whether an lDP candidate 
is able to (or chooses to) receive recommendation from the Kōmeitō leadership could bear 
significant consequences to not only his/her vote shares but also to their campaign strategies. 
Similarly, the Kōmeitō candidates also benefit from mutual recommendation system with 
15 Kōmei Shimbun, 3 october 1994
16 Kōmeitō’s election rates during general local elections were: 99.9 per cent (1995), 99.8 per cent 
(1999), 100 per cent (2003), 99.9 per cent (2007), and 99.9 per cent (2011) [Source: election Bureau, 
ministry of internal Affairs and communications]. 
17 interview with a staff at Sōka Gakkai staff on 1 february 2017.
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the lDP. The nomination from the lDP becomes a catalyst that beckon conservative voters 
to their side:
•  The reason why the Kōmeitō ask for lDP’s recommendation for their candidates is that, for 
example, they can make a poster with a picture of Prime minister next to their candidates, or 
if they can claim that their candidate has the official recommendation from the lDP, it would 
be easier for them to appeal to the conservative voters that their candidate shares their political 
interests.18
in other words, the Kōmeitō candidates can enlarge the pool of supporters to non-Kōmeitō, 
conservative voters, by obtaining the official label in the name of ‘recommended by the 
lDP.’ But because of the small number of district candidates Kōmeitō runs during general 
elections, the Kōmeitō’s cooperation to the lDP district candidates is compensated through 
other means as well, such as appealing to their own kōenkai members to vote for the Kōmeitō 
in PR; providing nomination to Kōmeitō candidates who are running in SmD in the same 
prefecture; agreeing on endorsement arrangement to concede a single-member district in 
the next general election (costa Rican arrangement); promising to nominate a Kōmeitō 
candidate in the prospective uh elections, etc. in other words, the imbalance of the weight 
of vote allocation between the lDP and Kōmeitō is adjusted as the two parties negotiate 
the allocation of electoral resources in terms of both candidate endorsement and votes for 
national elections. 
The institutionalization of ‘candidate-based recommendation system’ was mediated by 
two important organs established by Sōka Gakkai and the Kōmeitō. first, before the 1995 
local election, shakai kyōgikai, or society council, was established within Sōka Gakkai as an 
organ to discuss the measures for national and local elections. Essentially, shakai kyōgikai 
today is set up to evaluate potential candidates—both Kōmeitō and lDP—in each polity level 
before elections. While shakai kyōgikai, held in prefectural, regional (hōmen) and central 
levels, is set up by the Sōka Gakkai prior to relevant elections, liaison meeting, or so-called 
renraku kyōgikai, is held regularly on every Thursday in order to facilitate ‘communication’ 
between Sōka Gakkai and the Kōmeitō. it is through this renraku kyōgikai Kōmeitō makes 
official request to Sōka Gakkai to support certain candidates, who would be deliberated 
in shakai kyōgikai. The final decision on whether to approve the recommendation of lDP 
candidates is delivered at renraku kyōgikai, where the Sōka Gakkai and the Kōmeitō discuss 
the quality of every lDP candidate who ask for the organizations’ recommendation.19 
Because of the vast number of lDP district candidates, however, primary evaluations 
of each candidate are carried out at Kōmeitō’s prefectural headquarters. individual 
lDP candidates file the request for recommendation to the respective lDP prefectural 
headquarters (kenren), which are delivered collectively to the Kōmeitō counterpart in each 
prefecture. here, Kōmeitō’s prefectural executive board (kenkanjikai) carries out deliberation 
of individual lDP candidates who run in the prefecture, and decides whether to recommend 
them to the party’s central executive board (chūōkanjikai). Once the list is submitted by the 
prefectural executive board, the central executive board finalizes the decision and inform 
the lDP executive council at the central headquarter, and the decisions are also delivered at 
the party’s prefectural level. Simply put, the inter-party negotiations on ‘recommendation’ 
18 interview with a lower house lDP representative on 3 march 2017. 
19 interview with a Kōmeitō staff at central headquarter, 28 April 2017.
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take place semi-collectively at the prefectural level.20 For LDP candidates who do not 
receive recommendation from the Kōmeitō, Kōmeitō takes on the policy of jishu tōhyō, or 
autonomous voting, where the party does not support unitary candidate.
At the same time, as the coalition alliance sustained and cooperation deepened, it has 
become rarely the case where the Kōmeitō actually refuses to give party recommendation—
at least on the surface. once the Kōmeitō’s prefectural headquarters decide to recommend 
lDP candidates, the party’s central leadership rarely reject them; in most cases, some 
rejecting mechanism intervenes before the lDP candidates file the petition to the Kōmeitō’s 
prefectural headquarter.21 instead, the deterring mechanism functions in the way the Kōmeitō 
delays the prefectural-level ‘deliberation’ procedure until some conditions are met. for 
example, in the 2003 general election, Kōmeitō put off the issuances of recommendations 
to two lDP candidates who were running in okinawa, until the lDP agreed not to field its 
own candidate in District okinawa 1 and support Kōmeitō’s Shiraho Taichi as joint candidate 
instead.22 in other words, the Kōmeitō is able to control the outflow of its electoral resources 
by controlling the timing of recommendation. 
Aside from such downright negotiation of candidate coordination, there are other ways 
in which the Kōmeitō controls the allocation of its electoral resources—by implicitly 
timing the issuance of recommendation. not all lDP candidates receive recommendations 
at the same time. Typically, the Kōmeitō carries out candidate evaluation processes across 
multiple occasions, and the distribution of recommendations takes place after each renraku 
kyōgikai between Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai held every Thursday. The below table shows 
the distributions of the number of recommendations given from the Kōmeitō to lDP 
candidates before the 2009 general election held on August 30 (Table 2). While the lDP 
issued recommendations to all eight Kōmeitō candidates on the day of the dissolution of the 
lower house (July 21), the earliest issuance of recommendations from the Kōmeitō to the 
lDP candidates occurred on July 30, when the Kōmeitō announced the recommendations of 
ninety-two lDP candidates. Afterwards, Kōmeitō held weekly renraku kyōgikai at central 
level, where the party leadership discussed the issuance of recommendations to the remaining 
lDP candidates collectively. 
The question, then, is why the timing of issuance of recommendations differs among 
candidates. one reason for the extended evaluation period has something to do with the 
diverse backgrounds of lDP candidates. one Kōmeitō staff explained: 
20 interview with a Kōmeitō staff at central headquarter, 13 December 2016. 
21 one interviewee told me that, when the Kōmeitō supporters are clear about not wanting to support 
certain lDP candidate, then some brakes would be put on in order to prevent the candidate’s name 
from being included in the list (interview with a Kōmeitō headquarter staff on 28 April 2017).
22 Kōmei Shimbun, 18 August 2003.
Table 2. Date and number of Recommendations before the 2009 General election (Kōmeitō→ lDP)
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
ToTAl
Date July 30 Aug. 6 Aug. 13 Aug. 17 Aug. 20 Aug. 24
#Recommendation 92 128 44 6 1 1 272
Source: Kōmei Shimbun
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•  There are several reasons why the timings of the issuance of recommendations differ. one is 
when the lDP candidates are first-time runners. in this case, we have no idea what kind of 
person this candidate is, so the process can take time. Another reason has a lot to do with local 
context. it is a problem of ‘balance’ in each district, and the lDP and Kōmeitō must discuss 
the possibility of cooperation or negotiate the give-and-take.23
in other words, when and whether an lDP candidate can incorporate Kōmeitō supporters 
through recommendation system depends largely on both the ‘quality’ of the lDP candidate 
as well as the local weather of the two-party relations. The timings of the issuance of 
recommendations are the indicators that reveal the level of ‘cooperation’ between the 
two parties, especially at the local level, where inter-party negotiations, both official and 
unofficial, are carried out among local party leaders.
furthermore, the scale of support mobilization varies across districts not only due to 
divergence of personal relations at the local level, but also because of the unique distributions 
of Kōmeitō’s supporter demography characterized by high urban intensiveness. The source 
of Kōmeitō votes is concentrated in highly populated prefectures, which include government-
designated cities (seirei shitei toshi). Table 3 shows the highest prefectural vote share of the 
Kōmeitō in municipal-level elections held during the general local elections in 1999 and 
2003.24 in these two elections, Kōmeitō’s vote share is highest in osaka, Tokyo, hyogo, and 
Kanagawa, four of the highly populated prefectures where Kōmeitō fields its own candidates 
in district during Lower House elections. 
further, as Table 4 shows, the competitiveness of the Kōmeitō radically increases in 
government-designated cities as well as in Tokyo Special District assembly elections. Such 
competitiveness of the Kōmeitō vis-à-vis conservative parties particularly in urban cities was 
the fundamental reason why lDP was determined to win over cooperation from the Kōmeitō, 
who possesses significant number of loyal supporters in the very regions where lDP is 
most vulnerable. Put simply, in light of new electoral environment, the lDP’s strategy to 
compensate its shortcoming was to rely on the highly ‘urban’ support base of the Kōmeitō 
23 interview with a Kōmeitō headquarter staff on 28 April 2017.
24 municipal-level elections include: government-designated city assemblies, general city assemblies, 
Tokyo Special District assemblies, and town assemblies. 
Table 3. Kōmeitō’s Vote Shares in municipal elections by Prefecture 
1999 2003
Prefecture Vote Share Vote counts Prefecture Vote Share Vote counts
1 Osaka 21.3% 562,065 Osaka 23.5% 560,432
2 Tokyo 18.0% 667,946 Tokyo 20.2% 708,286
3 Hyogo 15.1% 223,493 Hyogo 16.7% 247,471
4 Kanagawa 14.9% 407,243 Kanagawa 15.9% 455,102
5 Kyoto 13.8% 106,281 Saitama 15.3% 278,986
Source: ministry of internal Affairs and communications
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(Rosenbluth and Yamada 2015).
At the same time, it is critical to note that this urban-rural complementarity of two parties’ 
support bases is often overstated. in reality, competitiveness of the Kōmeitō in urban regions 
and the power balance vis-à-vis the lDP in those districts can also become a source of 
tension. Because of the relatively high leverage Kōmeitō possesses in the urban districts, the 
party’s demand toward its coalition partner can expand. As one lDP representative put it:
•  in districts where lDP candidates are weak, in other words whose elections depend on the 
Kōmeitō votes, Kōmeitō tend to demand more from the lDP. … electoral cooperation can be 
difficult in regions such as Tokyo, osaka, Kanagawa, and hyogo, where Kōmeitō also runs its 
candidates in the districts during lh elections. in other words, in regions where lDP is strong, 
the cooperation with the Kōmeitō often goes smoothly, while in districts or prefectures where 
lDP is weak, difficulties can arise.25
in fact, the recommendation rates from Kōmeitō to the lDP have shown contrasting patterns 
between two regions where Kōmeitō also runs district candidates during lower house elections. 
figure 1 shows the recommendation rates from Kōmeitō to lDP candidates between Kanto 
and Kansai regions in the general elections from 2000 to 2014. While Kōmeitō possesses 
significant number of supporters in both regions, the levels of cooperation with the lDP was 
much higher in Kansai (Osaka and Hyogo districts) than in Kanto (Tokyo and Kanagawa 
districts), particularly in the early years of electoral alliance. in other words, the abundance of 
Kōmeitō’s electoral resources does not necessarily lead to mature and effective cooperation.
figure 1 Recommendation Rate (Kōmeitō → lDP) in General elections (2000-2014) by 
Region
Put another way, despite the conventional understanding of Kōmeitō organization as 
monolithic and centralized, the ways in which the electoral cooperation takes place between 
the lDP and the Kōmeitō in each district can vary depending on the local balance of power, 
as well as the local inter-party relations (cox 2003, umawatari 2013, ehrhardt 2014). it is 
such diversity of local personal/social relations and power balance between the two parties 
that provide incentives to the Kōmeitō to delegate decision-makings to the local actors, 
relieving the party’s central leadership from the responsibilities of having to weigh the 
sensitive political balance. While the ‘recommendation’ itself has grown to become mere 
formality as the cooperation deepened and coalition alliance prolonged, this procedure that 
25 interview with an lDP hoR representative on 6 march 2017.
Table 4. lDP and Kōmeitō’s Vote Gains (Share%) during General local elections in 2003
LDP Kōmeitō
Prefectural assembly 14,463,993 38.9% 2,995,330 8.1%
Government-designated city assembly 1,970,821 21.0% 1,267,146 18.1%
Tokyo Special District 739,299 30.3% 496,369 20.3%
Source: ministry of internal Affairs and communications
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must go through prefectural headquarters at every election is significant in that the inter-
party negotiations regarding electoral cooperation, from candidate endorsement to the issuing 
of recommendation, take place virtually at the prefectural level. furthermore, such local-
oriented decision-making process functions not only to incorporate local demands, but 
also as a defensive mechanism to avoid the risk of over-supporting the lDP counterpart by 
‘evaluating’ every candidate, and deter those whose ‘quality’ are questionable by Kōmeitō’s 
standards.
cAnDiDATe-BASeD moBilizATion AT DiSTRicT leVel
While the issuing of recommendations and controlling the timing of them can serve as 
an explicit signaling device for the Kōmeitō leadership to nudge its local organizations to 
mobilize support, the issuing of recommendation does not in itself commence full-fledged 
cooperation from the Kōmeitō supporters. Since the early stage, Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai 
have been known to implicitly control the degree to which the supporters participate in 
electoral cooperation with other political parties:
•  in many occasions Gakkai takes on jishu tōhyō even when Kōmei gives suisen or support. 
even when Gakkai takes on jishu tōhyō policy, its attitudes can differ election by election. in 
some cases, they would leave everything up to Kōmei; they would just let their supporters 
know about the fact that the Kōmei have given suisen or support; Kōmei politicians make 
appearance at Gakkai meeting and request support; or the Kōmeitō engages in active support 
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degrees of ‘support’ [from Sōka Gakkai].26
Such ‘implicit’ compartmentalization of the electoral cooperation suggests that the electoral 
cooperation at the lowest polity strata is carried out based on candidate-centered logic, 
rather than within party-to-party cooperative framework initiated by central leadership. 
Put another way, the candidate-based evaluation system adopted at the prefectural level 
became the means to allow the incorporation of Kōmeitō’s electoral resources into ‘personal’ 
support base of each lDP candidate. one Sōka Gakkai member asserted that the principle 
of candidate-based mobilization was implemented in order to assuage hostility against the 
lDP, which was prevalent among the members of Sōka Gakkai in the beginning of coalition 
formation, and minimize the risk of over-supporting its candidates: 
•  i think, when it came to supporting lDP candidates, the principle of candidate-based 
support has been maintained because we used to be pretty hostile toward one another in the 
past. moreover, we learned from the bitter experience of nfP and wanted to be careful by 
discerning the individual’s quality as a candidate.27
The Kōmeitō’s emphasis on the ‘quality of the candidate’ implies that the incorporation of 
Kōmeitō support depends largely on the local relationship between individual lDP candidate 
and the respective Kōmeitō voters. 
There are largely two aspects to the ‘candidate-based’ mobilization at the district 
level. first, the mechanism of candidate-based evaluation along with locally-delegated 
vote mobilization has functioned to allow rooms for individual Kōmeitō/Sōka Gakkai 
voters to make autonomous voting decisions, which essentially provides a buffer against 
policy/ideological incompatibilities. When i asked one Sōka Gakkai activist the reason 
for the absence of full-fledged cooperation in his district, he told me that some Sōka 
Gakkai members resent the candidate’s rightist remarks that are essentially incompatible 
to Kōmeitō’s ideological inclinations.28 in other words, the Kōmeitō allows a degree of 
autonomy for its voters in making their voting decisions in order to maintain organizational 
integrity as a collective body of ‘free and democratic’ individuals.29
Another function of ‘candidate-based mobilization’ is highlighted by the changes in the 
substance of so-called the ‘quality’ of the candidate (kōhosha no shitsu) since Ota reinforced 
in 1995. under the lDP-Kōmeitō framework, the ‘quality’ of the candidates, as well as the 
emphasis on one’s ‘understanding of Kōmeitō policies,’  became increasingly overshadowed 
by the criticality of local ‘give-and-take’ balance as well as district-to-district inter-party 
relations. Two cases in Tokyo and osaka from the 2005 general election demonstrate how the 
levels of cooperation from the Kōmeitō to lDP supporters are determined not necessarily by 
policy consistency, but by locally-sensitive ‘personal relations.’  
upon prime minister Koizumi’s dissolution of the lower house, Koike Yuriko, who had 
joined the lDP in 2000 and had run exclusively in PR, announced her candidacy in Tokyo 
10 as one of shikaku (i.e. ‘assassin’) candidates against three-time winner of the district 
26 (AeRA 2000) Pp 154.
27 interview with a professor of Soka university, 17 January 2017.
28 interview with a Sōka Gakkai member, 17 January 2017.
29 interview with a professor of Sōka university, 17 January 2017.
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Kobayashi Kōki, who voted against prime minister’s postal reform bill. on the other hand, in 
Tokyo 12, known as the ‘symbol’ of lDP-Kōmeitō electoral cooperation in Tokyo, Kōmeitō’s 
star politician ota Akihiro raised his hand, after lDP’s Yashiro eita from the district also 
voted against Koizumi’s signature legislation.30 Yashiro recanted his withdrawal from the 
district after the LDP leadership refused to list him at the top of regional PR list and decided 
to run as independent. lDP leadership, afraid that Yashiro’s candidacy would upset the 
Kōmeitō supporters and stagnate electoral cooperation in other districts in Tokyo, promised 
the party’s fullest cooperation for ota and even set up the unprecedented “special task force” 
to support the Kōmeitō candidate.31 for this, Tokyo Kōmeitō responded with highest level 
of cooperation to Koike Yuriko, claiming Tokyo District 10 as a ‘symbolic district of lDP-
Kōmeitō cooperation.’32 As the exit poll shows, the Kōmeitō voters displayed equally high 
coherence in supporting both Kōmeitō and lDP candidates (Table 5). 
on the other hand, in District osaka 2, Kōmeitō prioritized existing social relations 
over ‘policy consistency.’ A well-known jiban of Sato Akira who ‘inherited’ his father-in-
law’s kōenkai since the 2000 election, District osaka 2 became another field for competition 
between postal rebel and a shikaku candidate. unlike Kobayashi who had voiced crude 
criticism against nfP initiative during the 1996 general election, having run as an nfP 
candidate, Sato’s relationship with the Kōmeitō remained amicable since the early stage. in 
2005, Sato opposed Koizumi’s postal reform, causing him to face shikaku candidate Kawajo 
Shika as an independent candidate. unlike the case of District Tokyo 10, the Kōmeitō 
decided to take on autonomous voting, making Kawajo one of two lDP candidates in osaka 
districts who ran without recommendation from the Kōmeitō. even though she won against 
Sato by 2,500 votes, Kawajo was only able to mobilize 58% of combined support base of 
lDP and Kōmeitō, suggesting that the Kōmeitō voters seem to have been divided between 
Sato and Kawajo.33
These cases from two prefectures illustrate how it was not the ‘party label’ or ‘policy 
consistency’ that mattered most in Kōmeitō’s strategic choice; rather, it was a matter of 
‘local give-and-take’ as much as existing personal relations.  even though Kōmeitō officially 
supported Koizumi’s postal privatization, then the president of Kōmeitō Kanzaki Takenori 
30 ota and Yashiro had an agreement to run alternatively under so-called costa Rican agreement. in 
2005, it was Yashiro’s turn if he had not voted against postal reform. 
31 Asahi Shimbun, 29 August 2005.
32 Asahi Shimbun, 27 August 2005.
33 Kawajo’s vote gain was 73,953, while the combined number of lDP and Kōmeitō’s PR votes in 
osaka 2 in 2005 was 127,413 (lDP 80,528; Kōmeitō 46,885). 
Table 5. exit polls on voting decisions after 2005 general election
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implicitly suggested that the candidates’ position on the policy does not matter as much as 
the “personal relationships that have been cultivated at the local level.”34 Some suggest that 
Kōmeitō measures the levels of personal relationship, or tsukiai, based on the degree of 
material contributions such as the candidate’s kōenkai name list or how much votes s/he had 
mobilized for the Kōmeitō in the past.35
more importantly, these two functions of candidate-based mobilization—autonomous 
decision-making and prioritization of local contexts over inter-party framework—operate 
as critical risk-aversion mechanism for the junior partner. By delegating decision-making 
power to local and individual spheres, Kōmeitō has come to possess the ability to flexibly 
incorporate both internal and external demands. At the same time, Kōmeitō’s district-by-
district flexibility parallels the lDP candidates’ strategies for electoral mobilization as well. 
for the lDP candidates, their local Kōmeitō resources function as a kind of intermediary 
organization mobilized through the construction of personal accountability, rather than 
within inter-party framework, which continued to function as “an effective building block 
in mobilizing political support” (Park 1998, 236). Simply speaking, the incorporation of 
Kōmeitō votes into one’s personal support base occurs as a part of the effort of constructing 
one’s personal support organization, rather than as a simple embodiment of lDP-Kōmeitō 
coalition alliance at the central level, illuminating the ‘inclusive’ and ‘flexible’ nature of 
lDP’s personal kōenkai organizations that operate within the social configuration of each 
electoral district. 
concluSion AnD imPlicATion
The lDP-Kōmeitō alliance, a critical institution that has allowed the prolonged 
dominance of the LDP in the post-reform period, is often understood as the product of ‘illicit 
handshake’ between the two parties, which overlooks policy and ideological incompatibilities 
in order to stay in power. Yet such perspective ignores the dynamism of two-party 
cooperation, which becomes evident most vividly during the executions of electoral 
cooperation. As this study tried to illuminate, two parties successfully developed a system 
that allows flexible adjustment to divergent electoral environments across time and districts 
and devised internal mechanisms to deter risks in times of crises. 
At the same time, while the fact that the inter-party negotiation regarding the 
recommendation takes place at the prefectural level is critical aspect of the inter-party 
negotiation, it does not diminish the ‘centralized’ control over the inter-party relations. in 
other words, it is the central leadership that accommodates overall checks-and-balances 
in terms of party’s resource allocation. The reason why local leadership is given marginal 
autonomy in their decision-makings seems to lay in the central leadership’s incentive to 
accommodate local demands, which often become critical in the effective implementation 
of electoral cooperation. in a way, such downward delegation of local-level negotiation 
procedure can be characterized as what eldersveld called “reciprocal deference structure” 
(eldersveld 1964, 9). he argues that distribution of power within a party, no matter how 
oligarchic it may seem, does not follow a simple hierarchical order, but instead it is 
characterized by partial delegation of power to the local leadership. The diversity of local 
34 Asahi Shimbun, 25 August 2005.
35 Asahi Shimbun, 13 August 2005.
SuSTAininG coAliTion ThRouGh ADAPTiVe elecToRAl AlliAnce 95
logics that generates divergent ways of executing electoral cooperation must not be confused 
with the lack of centralized coordination between the two parties’ central leadership. 
There are a few critical implications that can be drawn from the case of lDP-Kōmeitō 
alliance. First and foremost, the local adjustment mechanisms established between the two 
parties suggest that flexibilities, rather than the rigidity, of inter-party electoral alliance 
explain the sustainability of the two-party cooperation. Second, mechanism of lDP-Kōmeitō 
alliance embedded in local environments suggest the resilience of personal vote cultivation, 
which requires efforts among both lDP and Kōmeitō district candidates in constructing one’s 
own electoral resources. While conventional studies have assumed somewhat disinterested 
and equal vote relocation mechanism operating between the two parties, in reality, Kōmeitō’s 
organized votes are incorporated not unilaterally but on individual basis, degree of which 
must be measured within a local-specific context. To overlook such dynamism risks 
neglecting the necessity of reevaluating the nature of electoral competition after the electoral 
system reform in Japan. 
Article Received: 21-10-2019 Revised: 22-11-2019 Accepted: 10-12-2019
RefeRenceS
AeRA. 2000. Anatomy of Soka Gakkai (Soka gakkai kaibo): Asahi Shimbunsha.
Axelrod, Robert. 1970. Conflict of Interest: A theory of divergent goals with applications to 
Politics. chicago: markham.
Bawn, Kathleen. 1999. "Voter Responses to electoral complexity: Ticket Splitting, Rational 
Voters and Representation in the federal Republic of Germany."  British Journal of 
Political Science 29 (3):487-505. doi: undefined.
cain, Bruce e., John A. ferejohn, and morris P. fiorina. 1987. The Personal Vote: 
Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. cambridge: harvard university 
Press.
carey, John m., and matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. "incentives to cultivate a personal vote: 
A rank ordering of electoral formulas."  Electoral Studies 14 (4):417-439. doi: https://
doi.org/10.1016/0261-3794(94)00035-2.
cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral 
Systems. new York: cambidge university Press.
cox, Karen e. . 2003. "A local five-party alliance challenges teh lDP in hyogo." in Japanese 
Electoral Politics: Creating a New Party System, edited by Steven Reed, 84-104. 
london: Routledge.
Duverger, maurice. 1964. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern 
State. london: methuen.
ehrhardt, George. 2009. "Rethinking the Komeito Voter."  Japanese Journal of Political 
Science 10 (1):1-20. doi: 10.1017/S1468109908003344.
ehrhardt, George. 2014. "how Kōmeitō politicians get elected." in Kōmeitō : politics 
and religion in Japan, edited by Axel Klein George ehrhardt, levi mclaughlin, 
and Steven Reed, 113-138. Berkeley: institute of east Asian Studies, university of 
california.
eldersveld, Samuel J. 1964. Political Parties: A Behavirol Analysis. chicago: Rand mcnally 
96 SuKeui Sohn
& company.
Gschwend, Thomas. 2006. "Ticket-splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: 
evidence from Germany."  European Journal of Political Research 46 (1):1-23. doi: 
10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00641.x.
hasunuma, linda, and Axel Klein. 2014. "Komeito in coalition." in Komeito: Politics and 
Religion in Japan, edited by Axel Klein George ehrhardt, levi mclaughlin, and 
Steven Reed, 240-265. Berkeley: institute of east Asian Studies.
herrmann, michael, and franz urban Pappi. 2008. "Strategic voting in German 
constituencies."  Electoral Studies 27 (2):228-244. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.electstud.2007.10.007.
hori, Yukio. 1999. Kōmeitōron: Sono kōdō to taishitu [Theory on Kōmeitō:   its Behavior 
and Predisposition]. Tokyo: nansosha.
Kabashima, ikuo. 2014. Trajectory of Postwar Politics: Formation and Transformation of 
the LDP System (Sengo seijino kiseki: Jiminto shisutemuno seikei to henyo). Tokyo: 
iwanami Shoten.
Kabashima, ikuo, and Koshi Yamamoto. 2004. "Komeito's choice under coalition 
Government (Renritsu seiken ni okeru komeitou no sentaku)."  Sekai 727:143-153.
Kato, Junko, and michael laver. 2003. "Policies and inter-party competitions after the 2000 
general election in Japan (nisennen sousenkyogono nihonni okeru seisaku to seitoukan 
kyoso)."  Leviathan 33:130-142.
Kawato, Tadafumi. 2004. Electoral Systems and Party Systems (Senkyo seido to seitou 
shisutemu): Bokutakusha.
Klein, Axel, and Steven Reed. 2014. "Religious Groups in Japanese electoral Politics." in 
Kōmeitō : Politics and Religion in Japan, edited by George ehrhardt, Axel Klein, 
levi mclaughlin and Steven Reed, 25-48. Berkeley: institute of east Asian Studies.
Kōmeitōshi hensan iinkai, [ editorial committee for  Kōmeitō  history]. 2014. Taishū to 
tomoni: Kōmeitō gojū nen no aymi [Together with the People: Fifty-Year History of 
Kōmeitō]. Tokyo: Kōmeitō  Shuppan.
leiserson, michael A. . 1966. "coalitions in Politics: A theoretical and empirical study." 
Political Science, Yale university.
liff, Adam P., and Ko maeda. 2018. "electoral incentives, policy compromise, and coalition 
durability: Japan's lDP–Komeito Government in a mixed electoral system."  Japanese 
Journal of Political Science:1-21. doi: 10.1017/S1468109918000415.
mcelwain, Kenneth mori. 2012. "The nationalization of Japanese elections."  Journal of 
East Asian Studies 12 (3):323-350,481.
murakami, Shigeyoshi. 1969. Kōmeitō. Tokyo: Shinnihon Shuppansha.
nakano, Jun. 2016. Research on Soka Gakkai and the Komeito: Intrinsic Logic of LDP-
Komeito Coalition Government (Soka gakkai-Komeito no kenkyu: Jiko renritu seiken 
no naizai ronri): iwanami Shoten.
nishijima, hisashi. 1968. Kōmeitō. Tokyo: Setsukasha.
noguchi, Yusuke, Kiyoshi Takigawa, and Shuichi Kodaira. 2016. Jitsumei Kokuhatsu:  Sōka 
Gakkai [Indicting   Sōka Gakkai]. Tokyo: Kinyobi.
Park, cheol-hee. 1998. "electoral Strategies in urban Japan." Ph.D., Political Sicence, 
columbia univeristy.
Roberts, Geoffrey K. 1988. "The ‘second-vote’ campaign strategy of the West German free 
Democratic Party*."  European Journal of Political Research 16 (3):317-337. doi: 
10.1111/j.1475-6765.1988.tb00155.x.
SuSTAininG coAliTion ThRouGh ADAPTiVe elecToRAl AlliAnce 97
Rosenbluth, f. m. , and michael f. Thies. 2010. Japan Transformed: Political Change and 
Economic Restructuring. Princeton: Princeton university Press.
Rosenbluth, f. m., and K. Yamada. 2015. "electoral Adaptation and Business cycles in Post-
1994 Japan."  ASIAN SURVEY 55 (6):1071-1092. doi: 10.1525/AS.2015.55.6.1071.
Sasaki, nobuo. 2011. Tochiji: Power and Tokyo Governance [Governor of Tokyo: kenryoku 
to tosei]. Tokyo: chuko Shinsho.
Sato, masaru, and natsuo Yamaguchi. 2016. Ima  Kōmeitōga kangaete irukoto [What 
Kōmeitō is thinking now]. Tokyo: ushio Shuppansha.
Scheiner, ethan. 2006. Democracy without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a 
One-Party Dominant State. new York: cambridge university Press.
Shimada, hiromi. 2007. Komeito vs. Soka Gakkai (komeito vs. soka gakkai): Asahi 
Shimbunsha.
Sugawara, Taku. 2004. "Rural-Bias in Japanese Politics (nihon seiji ni okeru noson baiasu)." 
Nihon Seiji Kenkyu 1 (1):53-86.
Taniguchi, masaki, Shiro Sakaiya, chihiro ookawa, and hideaki uenohara. 2010. "The 2010 
upper house election: Autumn Breeze Blowing for the DPJ Government? (2010 nen 
sangiin senkyo: minshuseiken ni fuku akikaze?)."  Sekai 809:58-69.
umawatari, Tsuyoshi. 2013. "Details of decision-makings in local party organizations: 
cases of lDP kenren in Aomori and Akita (chiho seito soshikini okeru ishikettei no 
shosai: Jiminto aomoriken/akitakenren no jirei kara)." in Political Studies of Party 
Organizations (Seito soshiki no seiji gaku), edited by masahiko Tatebayashi. Tokyo: 
Toyo Keizai Shinposha.
White, Jonathan. 2018. "The ethics of Political Alliance."  British Journal of Political 
Science 48 (3):593-609. doi: 10.1017/S0007123417000709.
Yakushiji, Katsuyuki. 2016. Fifty-Year Trajectory of Komeito-Soka Gakkai (Komeito-Soka 




Institute for Japanese Studies, Seoul National University
ADDRESS: 
#108-601 Shincheon-ro 49, Gwangmyeong City
Shincheon Humansia Apt. Complex 1
Republic of Korea
TEL: 010-4909-6834
sogisohn@gmail.com 

